

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00405 211759Z

73

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /092 W

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R 211625Z JUL 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1709

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MBFR VIENNA 0405

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 21 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

1. THE ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE ON JULY 21, WITH UK REP (ROSE) IN THE CHAIR. US REP AND SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV) MADE THE ONLY FORMAL STATEMENTS. SOVIET REP'S STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY SEPTEL. IN HIS STATEMENT, US REP EMPHASIZED THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECEMBER 16 WESTERN PROPOSALS, HIGHLIGHTED THE FAILURE OF THE EAST TO PROVIDE A SERIOUS AND POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THOSE PROPOSALS, AND MADE PASSING REFERENCE TO THE TABLING OF EASTERN DATA AND THE NEED TO CLARIFY DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE EASTERN FIGURES AND WESTERN DATA. THE MAIN POINTS US REP'S STATEMENT WERE:

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00405 211759Z

A. ON DECEMBER 16, 1975, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MADE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ADDITIONS OF GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE TO THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, OFFERING THEREBY A PRACTICAL AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR ENDING THE IMPASSE IN WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS FIND THEMSELVES.

B. THE EAST IS YET TO PROVIDE THE SERIOUS AND POSITIVE RESPONSE WHICH THE WEST'S DECEMBER 16 PROPOSALS DESERVE.

C. TO APPRECIATE THE FULL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS THE WEST HAS PROPOSED TO UNDERTAKE, THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY THE WEST MUST BE ASSESSED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONTENT OF THE DECEMBER 16 INITIATIVE.

D. IN ORDER TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE LARGE AND DESTABILIZING IMBALANCES IN MANPOWER AND TANKS, WHICH CHARACTERIZE THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN TH AREA, THE WEST HAS PROPOSED REDUCTIONS LEADING TO APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

E. THE OUTCOME PROPOSED BY THE WEST OF A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING BOTH ON GROUND FORCES AND ON THE COMBINED TOTAL OF AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IS AN INTRINSICALLY STABLE AND EQUITABLE ONE.

F. EASTERN OFJECTIONS THAT THE WEST IS SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE LEAVES OUT OF ACCOUNT THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECEMBER 16 NUCLEAR PROPOSAL AND MISSES THE SENSE OF THE WESTERN MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH.

G. UNDER THIS APPROACH, EACH SIDE WOULD COMMIT ITSELF TO A PACKAGE OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WHOSE COMPOSITION WOULD BE DEFERENT BUT WHOSE IMPLEMENTATION WOULD NOT RESULT IN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR EITHER SIDE.

H. CRITICISMS WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE WESTERN REDUCTION
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00405 211759Z

PACKAGE ALSO APPEAR TO REFLECT AN INACCURATE EVALUATION OF ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

I. A SIMPLE NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE SIZE OF PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL FORCE COMPONENTS CANNOT LEAD TO CORRECT CONCLUSIONS.

J. A THOROUGH, CORRECT EVALUATION REQUIRES THAT

ALL RELEVANT CRITERIA BE APPLIED AND THAT THE RESULTS OF APPLYING THESE CRITERIA BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TOGETHER.

K. SUCH AN EVALUATION SHOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY THE NUMERICAL SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, BUT ALSO THE CHARACTER OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OFFERED AS WELL AS THE RELATIVE IMPACT ON EACH SIDE OF THESE OBLIGATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS.

L. WHEN ALL PERTINENT FACTORS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT THE MILITARY EFFECT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS THE WEST IS PROPOSING TO UNDERTAKE FOR ITSELF WOULD BE AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE MILITARY EFFECT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WHICH IT IS ASKING THE EAST TO UNDERTAKE.

M. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 19 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO THE WEST'S DECEMBER 16 PROPOSALS.

N. ALTHOUGH THE FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL DOES REPRESENT A MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION AS REGARDS THE SEQUENCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS AND THE PROVISION FOR TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, IT CONTAINS NO MOVEMENT TOWARDS MAJOR WESTERN INTERESTS CONCERNING REDUCTIONS.

O. THE EAST IS STILL ADHERING TO ITS ORIGINAL REQUIREMENT OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE OR EQUAL NUMBER REDUCTIONS OF ALL PERSONNEL AND ALL ARMAMENTS.

P. MOREOVER, THE FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL MAKES NO MOVE TOWARD THE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00405 211759Z

TO PHASING.

Q. THE EAST IS STILL REQUIRING THAT, IN A FIRST AGREEMENT, THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, OTHER THAN THE US, UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS RELATING TO THE TIMING, CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THEIR REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND STAGE.

R. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR DISBANDMENT OF UNITS WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA DOES NOT MEET THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST AS REGARDS FLANK SECURITY, THOUGH IT SEEMS TO CONSTITUTE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE EAST AGREES THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF FLANK SECURITY.

S. THE TABLING BY THE EAST ON JUNE 10 OF FIGURES

ON THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE
AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS POSITIVE, THOUGH LONG OVERDUE
STEP.

T. THERE ARE, IN ANY CASE, LARGE DISCREPANCIES
BETWEEN WESTERN DATA AND THE DATA THE EAST HAS TABLED, THE
REASONS FOR WHICH WILL NEED TO BE FULLY DISCUSSED AND
MADE CLEAR.

U. IF THE EAST IS TRULY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS,
IT SHOULD MAKE THE SERIOUS AND POSITIVE RESPONSE WHICH
IS CALLED FOR BY THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 16.

2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE US STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY
AIRGRAM.RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DATA, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MBFRV00405
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760281-0568
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760737/aaaabggy.tel
Line Count: 185
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 MAR 2004 by greeneet>; APPROVED <25 MAR 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 21 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT
TAGS: PARM, XH, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006